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The Republic of China's Claims Relating to the 
Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf, and Exclusive 
Economic Zones: Legal and Economic Aspects· 
by Joseph W. Dellapenna·· 
and AT-Young Wang··· 
I. PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS AND SoLUTIONS 
For centuries the world's oceans were regarded as belonging to whomever 
could assert control over them. I As a result they were taken over, exploited 
and divided up by the powerful maritime nations with large navies which set 
about exploring unknown seas and appropriating new worlds. 
In the 15th century, the Pope divided the "ownership" of the world's 
oceans between Spain and Portuga}2 which at the time had done the most 
maritime exploration. But this did not sit well with England, another great 
• This article is the final report of a study prepared for the National Executive Yuan of the 
Republic of China. Pursuant to the recommendations of this report the Republic by a decree 
issued September 6, 1979, enlarged its territorial sea to a breadth of 12 miles, and for the first 
time claimed an exclusive economic zone out to 200 miles from its coasts. The report has been 
edited slightly by the authors and footnotes have been added for purposes of publication. 
(Editor'. Note: This report is being reprinted in its entirety with explanatory footnotes and 
modifications as provided by the authors. The purpose of reprinting this report in this form is to 
provide the public with access to the report as it was submitted to the National Ex~cutjve Yuan of 
the Republic of China.) 
•• Professor of Law, Villanova University; B.B.A., University of Michigan (1965); J.D., 
Detroit College of Law (1968); LL.M. in Public International and Comparative Law, the George 
Washington University (1969); LL.M., Columbia University (1975). Professor Dellapenna was 
a Fullbright-Hays Senior Lecturer in Law at National Chengchi University in Taiwan, 
1978-1979 . 
••• Associate Research Fellow, the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica; B.A., 
Chunghsin Provincial University (1969); Ph.D. (Econ.), University of Cincinnati (1974). Mr. 
Wang is currently an Associate Professor at California State College at Sacramento and a first-
year law student at McGeorge School of Law. 
1. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 195 (6th ed. H. Waldock ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as 
BRIERLY); C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 48-55 (6th rev. ed. 1967) 
[hereinafter cited as COLOMBOS); T. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 3-6, 369-77 (1911) 
[hereinafter cited as FULTON); E. JONES, LAW OF THE SEA 6-12 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
JONES); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 582-86 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955) 
[hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM). 
2. COLOMBOS, supra note I, at 49; JONES, supra note I, at 8. 
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maritime nation. When Philip II of Spain loftily warned Elizabeth I of 
England to order Francis Drake not to enter the "Spanish" waters in the 
Pacific she replied, "[T]he use of the sea and air is common to all; neither can 
any title to the ocean belong to any people [or] private man forasmuch as 
neither nature nor regard of public use permitteth any possession thereof."3 
Not long after that, the Dutch were told by the eminent jurist Grotius when 
he wrote about the right to sail the sea: "The ocean which encompasses the 
terrestrial home of mankind with the ebb and flow of its tides . . . cannot be 
held or enclosed, being itself the possessor rather than the possessed.' '4 He 
added: "Most things become exhausted with promiscuous use. This is not the 
case with the sea. It can be exhausted neither by fishing nor by navigation: 
That is to say, in the two ways in which it can be used."5 
Grotius's view, announced in 1609, became the basic rule of international 
maritime law, at least as far as the freedom of the "high seas" was concerned. 
However, with the passage of time, and mainly for defense reasons, it became 
the custom and practice that a coastal state had sovereign rights up to three 
miles from its shores, beyond which the freedom of the seas principle generally 
applied. 6 
In 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson of the United States asserted 
his country's sovereignty over a three-mile-wide strip of water bordering the 
new nation's Atlantic coast,7 three miles being the distance of one marine 
league. 8 The idea caught on and many other nations, seeing the advantage of 
a buffer zone between land and sea, followed suit with the same kind of 
declaration. This is sometimes explained as the range ofland based cannon,9 
but even when the range became much greater, three miles remained the 
internationally-recognized limit of a nation's sovereignty. 10 
As recently as 1930 at the Conference on the Law of the Sea sponsored by 
the League of Nations there was general agreement of the law of the sea: 11 the 
3. COLOMBOS, supra note 1, at 50-51; FULTON, supra note I, at 109-11; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra 
note I, at 584. 
4. H. GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM pI. II, c. 2, § 3 (R. Magoffin tr. 1916). 
5. /d. 
6. BRIERLY, supra note 1, at 202-04; COLOMBOS, supra note I, at 60-66, 87-95; JONES, supra 
note 1, at 10-13; 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 454-59 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited 
as O'CONNELL); 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 584-91. 
7. Note from Secretary of State Jefferson to the British Minister, Nov. 8, 1793, reprinted in 1 J. 
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 702-03 (1906). 
8. BRIERLY, supra note I, at 202-03; Heinzen, The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of/he 
Seas, 11 STAN. L. REV. 597, 605-12 (1959); Wilkes, The Use of World Resources Without Conflict: 
Myths About the Territorial Sea, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 441 (1968). 
9. C. BYNHERSHOEK, DE DOMINIO MARIS DISSERTATIO 41-45 (1923); COLOMBOS, supra note 
I, at 92-93; FULTON, supra note 1, at 558; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 490-92; Walker, Ter-
ritorial Waters: The Common Shot Rule, 22 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 210 (1945) [hereinafter cited as 
Walker). 
10. Walker, supra note 9, at 230-31; but see 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note I, at 491-92. See also 
JONES, supra note I, at 56-60. 
11. BRIERLY, supra note I, at 203-07; COLOMBOS, supra note I, at 103-08. 
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high sea was free for the use of all; a narrow, generally three nautical miles 
wide, belt of territorial seas were subject to the sovereignty of the adjacent 
state and several somewhat wider, but still essentially narrow, contiguous 
zones were recognized for the control of sanitary, defense, immigration and 
smuggling problems, After World War II this consensus rapidly disintegrated, 
so that in the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
although it succeeded in drafting four conventions on the law of the sea, there 
was no agreement on the proper breadth of the territorial sea and other impor-
tant matters,12 and the Convention on the Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the Sea failed to secure general ratification. 13 What consensus 
there was in 1958 gradually disappeared in the face of advancing technology 
and increasingly divergent claims by the vastly enlarged community of na-
tions, Two subsequent United Nations Conferences on the Law ofthe Sea-
in 1960,14 and beginning in 1973 (this third conference recently opened its 
Eigth Session in Geneva) - thus far have failed to produce any new conven-
tions, and seem only to have more sharply focused the differing perspectives of 
the industrialized North and the underdeveloped South.15 
The result of this apparent confusion in the law of the sea is a steadily 
emerging new consensus - emerging in the form of state practice rather than 
in the form of treaties. The resources of the sea are no longer viewed as inex-
haustible,16 thanks largely to enhanced capabilities in the technologies for 
fishing and for extraction of mineral wealth. Even when used solely for navi-
gation, increasing areas of the major sea routes are too busy to rely solely on 
regulation of each ship only by the nation whose flag it flies,17 while the conse-
quences of navigational accidents may so substantially effect the neighboring 
12. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, of1nrldfor signature April 
19,1958, art. 6,15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (in force Sept. 10, 1964) 
[hereinafter cited as Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone). See also BRIER· 
LY, supra note I, at 207-08; O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 459-67. 
13. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, of1nrld 
for signature April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (in force 
March 20, 1966). U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (Pub. No. 8847 1976) [hereinafter 
cited as TREA11ES IN FORCE), lists only 34 parties, which includes none ofthe major deepsea fish-
ing nations. 
14. Dean, The Second GmnJa Corif"nKe on till Law oj till Sea: Till Fight for Freedom of till Sea, 54 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 751 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Dean). 
15. See, e.g., Darman, The Law oj till Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, 56 FOR. AFF. 373 (1978); 
Dickey, Should till Law oj till Sea Conftrenu Be SaDed, 12 INT'L LAW. I (1978); Till U.N. ConfernKe on 
till Law oj till Sea: An ABA Panel Discussion at Chicago, 12 INT'L LAW. 21 (1978). 
16. J. BARDACH, HARVEST OF THE SEA (1968); B. BUZAN, SEABED POLmcs (1976); F. 
CHRISTY, JR. & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OcEAN FISHERIES (1965); D. CUCHING, 
FISHERIES RESOURCES OF THE SEA AND THEIR MANAGEMENT (1975); J. GULLAND, THE 
MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES (1975); H. KNIGHT, MANAGING THE SEA'S LIVING 
RESOURCES (1977); D. LEIPZIGER & J. MUDGE, SEABED MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE 
ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF DEVEWPING COUNTRIES (1976). 
17. Alexander, Regionalism and till Law oj till Sea: Till Case oj Semi· Enclosed Seas, 2 OCEAN DEV. & 
INT'L L. J. 151 (1974); Hardy, Regional Approacllls to Law oj till Sea Problems: Till European Communi· 
~, 24 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 336 (1975). 
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shore as to create a demand for shore-based control and regulation. IS While 
these technologies generate pressure to extend national claims into adjacent 
seas, at the same time advances in military technologies create the means to ef-
fectuate such claims. Such devices as aerial surveillance, radar, sonar, and 
high speed patrol craft give any nation willing to spend the relatively modest 
sums these devices cost the capability of effectively controlling ever wider ex-
panses of sea. Thus tiny Iceland has three times in the last 20 years extended 
its claims to an exclusive fishing zone (to 12, 50, and finally 200 miles), and 
enforced it successfully in the face of at times serious opposition from the 
United Kingdom, despite the latter's vastly greater military and economic 
resources. 19 The effect of this combination of motive and means has been a 
steady erosion of freedom of the seas - until 1950 the cornerstone of all think-
ing about the law of the sea .. 
This erosion of the freedom of the sea poses several problems for the 
Republic of China. First, because of its exclusion from the United Nations,20 
it has not been permitted to participate in the currently ongoing Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Thus it has not been able in any 
formal way to make its views known on the many troubling questions which 
that Conference has been struggling with - so far unsuccessfully. Second, as 
more and more states come to assert exclusive claims to areas of the seas adja-
cent to their coast, Chinese interests are being progressively excluded from 
these areas. 21 At the same time, by refraining from making similar claims 
itself, alien interests, often from the same nations which claim to exclude ~ses 
by foreigners, are free to extract wealth from waters up to three miles from the 
coasts of the Republic of China. As the Republic of China finds fishing one of 
its major industries, and as this Chinese fishing industry is developing an in-
creasingly advanced technological base, which both permits extensive opera-
tions in distant waters and intensive operations in nearby waters, important 
economic interests in the Republic of China face serious loss. Furthermore, 
18. Clingan, The Law Affecting the Quality of the Marine Environmen!, 26 MIAMI L. REV. 223 
(1971); Dellapenna, CafUldian Claims in Arctic Waters, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 383 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as Dellapenna, CafUldian Claims); Knight, Issues &fore the Third u.N. Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, 34 LA. L. REV. 155, 187-88 (1974). Set gtntrally R. SHINN, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS OF MARINE POLLUTION CONTROL (1974). 
19. The Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), (1974) I.C.]. 4. See 
Bilder, The Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 37; Agreement Concerning British 
Fishing in Icelandic Waters, June I, 1976, Iceland-United Kingdom, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS 878 (1976). 
20. The Republic of China withdrew from membership in the U.N. on October 24, 1971. 
21. As will be developed below, the Republic has developed a substantial deep-sea fishing in-
dustry which is progressively excluded from ever greater parts of the ocean by claims of 200 mile 
exclusive fishing zones by ever increasing numbers of nations. See, e.g., The Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. S 1801 (Supp. 1977). 
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should the extraction of important minerals from seabeds near the Republic of 
China become feasible, these resources also are not yet effectively controlled 
by the government, Even should the government decide to permit foreign in-
vestment in such extractions, there should be administrative means for 
regulating the activities of such investors, and for realizing national revenues 
from their activities. Should the Republic of China develop the necessary 
technologies itself, and attempt to extract minerals from more distant seabeds, 
it would once again encounter nearly universal claims around the world to ex-
clude foreigners from such activities. 22 Fortunately thus far, assertions of 
power to regulate pure navigation have been especially limited, and generally 
have not threatened interests of the Republic of China. Should claims be made 
which do interfere with navigation interests of the Republic of China, 
however, the Republic's adherence to the narrow, traditional claims gives it 
little negotiating leverage in any attempt to resolve such difficulties. 
The problems presented to the Republic of China by these ongoing develop-
ments in the Law of the Sea are peculiarly difficult because of the frequently 
adverse diplomatic situations confronting it. Not only is the Republic ex-
cluded from the Third United Nations Conference, but it also has unusual im-
pediments in bilateral relations with many nations. In the face of these diffi-
culties merely to negotiate any solution to such disputes as from time to time 
arise makes it desirable for the Republic of China to be in a position to give 
rights or privileges to the other nations, as well as to claim rights or privileges 
for itself. On the other hand, making such claims is likely to create a new 
source of discord with other nations, when there might appear to be difficulties 
enough already. 
As mentioned above, the immediate and most serious problems the 
Republic of China faces will be the restriction of fishing within the exclusive 
fishing zones, which have been announced by many coastal states. Some brief 
reviews of various coastal states' claims on these 200-mile exclusive zones will, 
therefore, be necessary, 
In 1947, Chile and Peru, both with long coastlines made unilateral claims of 
"protection and control" out to a distance of 200 nautical miles to reserve for 
their own exclusive use the rich anchovy fishery created by the offshore up-
welling ofthe nutrient-rich Humboldt Current. 23 In 1952, these two countries 
22. Aquilar, The Patrimonial Sea or Economic Zone Concept, 11 SAN DIEC,o L. REV. 579 (1974); 
Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the Law of the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 569 (1975); Clingan, Emerging Law of the Sea: The Economic Zone Dilemma, 14 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 530 (1977); Nawaz, The Emergency of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Implications for a New LtJw of 
the SetJ, 16 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 471 (1976); Pollard, The Exclusive Economic Zone - The Elusive Con-
sensus, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 600 (1975). 
23. Wolff, PeruvitJn-United SltJtes Relations over MtJritimt Fishing: 1945-1969, LAW OF THE SEA 
INST. (Occ. Paper No.4, March 19701. 
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with Ecuador signed the Declaration of Santiago, jointly asserting 200 mile 
claims. 24 Oiher nations followed their lead. 
The United States 200-mile fishing limit law, which took effect on March 1, 
1977,25 appears to have won general but cautious approval of the fishing in-
dustry. The United States intended to ensure that stocks of fish found within 
200 miles of the coast are properly conserved and that its fishermen obtain the 
maximum benefit from those stocks. It provides that fish, which are surplus 
after conservation needs and the requirements of the U. S. recreational and 
commercial fishermen have been met, may be allocated to foreign vessels to 
catch under certain tightly controlled circumstances. 26 
Foreign vessels must apply for permits to fish the U.S. Fishery Conserva-
tion Zone. Each foreign fishing vessel is charged a fixed annual access fee oUI 
per gross registered ton, not to exceed $5,000 per vesselY In addition, each 
foreign nation with fishing vessels in the zone is charged a fee of 3.5 per cent of 
the total dockside value of pounds of fish allocated to that nation. Foreigners 
are not able to keep any salmon, Pacific halibut, or creature of the continental 
shelf such as crabs, unless authorized. The possiblity of expanding trawl 
fishing is exciting considerable interest among U.S. west coast fishermen. 
This is evidenced by the number of new trawlers being built, others being con-
verted and the rush to buy sophisticated electronic fish finding and catching 
gear. 
Canada's management of the 200-mile offshore fishing zone, which went 
into effect on January 1, 1977, has given Canada an area of more than 
600,000 square miles of high seas to patrol and manage. 28 As a condition of 
licensing, foreign fishing vessels must supply the Canadian authorities with in-
formation on catch and fishing effort. About 1000 at-sea and in-port inspec-
tions offoreign vessels took place in 1977. Maximum fines on a single charge 
are 525,000; other possible penalties are loss of catch, vessel and fishing 
licenses. Jail sentences can go up to two years. Given sufficient justification, 
Canada could also take away the licenses of all other vessels from the 
offender's country. 
Australia, which announced a 200-nautical mile fishing zone on March 31, 
24. The Declaration of Santiago, Aug. 18, 1952, Agreement between Chile, Ecuador & Peru, 
signed at the First Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources 
of the South Pacific, Santiago, August 18, 1952, Declaration on the Maritime Zone, U.N. Doc. 
AlAC. 135/10/Rev. I, at 11-12, reprinted in H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, 
DOCUMENTS, AND READINGS 705-07 (1978) [hereinafter cited as KNIGHT). 
25. The Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976, 16 U .S.C. § 1801 (Supp. 1977). 
26. /d. U 1821-1825. 
27. [d. § 1824(b)(10). See 50 C.F.R. § 611.22 (1978). 
28. Canada: Proposed Fishing Zones, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1372 (1976). 
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1978,29 has the second longest coastline of any country in the world, about 
20,000 km. Although the continental shelf is fairly narrow along much of the 
coast, the area of shelf adjacent to Australia is also great - about 2 million 
square km., which places Australia about third in comparison with other 
countries. In spite of this immense coastal area Australia ranks low among the 
fishing nations. It is not even among the first 50 fishing nations. 
On Australia's northern shelf, a Taiwanese scientist, H. C. Liu, has 
estimated the demersal fish stock of this area at 2 million tons, 30 and he sug-
gests that in this area the sustainable yield may be as high as 50 per cent ofthe 
unexploited stock size of one million tons. 31 Since 1970, the fishing fleet ofthe 
Republic of China has fished in this area, and caught annually about 80,000 
tons,32 which occupied about 9 per cent of the Republic's annual fishing 
catch." However, the Sino-Australian fishing agreement, signed in spring 
1979, has only permitted the Republic's ships to catch 37,500 tons annually in 
future years. 3. 
In order to manage its resources properly, Australia would have to acquire 
sufficient knowledge and understanding ofthem to enable her to do SO.35 Thus 
in deciding on the conditions under which other nations should be permitted 
to fish within the Australian zone, three main considerations are involved. 
These are: support for the Australian economy and assistance to the 
Australian industry in developing the capability to utilize these resources 
itself; proper management of the resources; and assistance in acquiring the 
knowledge necessary to establish good management practices. 
Before examining proposals which the Republic of China could adopt, we 
must first realize that the fishery industry is one of the most important in-
dustries in the Republic. The number of fishermen in Taiwan, the Republic of 
China, at the end of 1977 numbered 301,518, of whom 190,302 were full-time 
and 111,216 were part-time. 36 The total fisheries production in 1977 reached 
854,784 mt. The breakdown among the four categories of fisheries is shown in 
the following Table 1. In, the same Table, we will also show the production 
goals, planned by the authorities, of these four categories to the end of 1986. 
29. Allen, ExtmJed Fishing Zone Calls for Major Inmose in Research Efforts and Budget, in 
AUSTRAUAN FISHERIES 3 (Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Allen). 
30. Liu, The Demersal Fish Stock of the Waters of North and Northwest Australia, 6 ACTA OCEANO-
GRAPHIC TAIWANICA 185 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Liu). 
31. For a detailed discussion of the bioeconomics of sustainable yield, see Smith, Economics of 
Productionfrom Natural Resources, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 409 (1968). 
32. See Liu, supra note 30. 
33. FISHERIES YEARBOOK OF THE TAIWAN AREA 30 (Provincial Gov't of Taiwan 1978) 
[hereinafter cited as FISHERIES YEARBOOK). 
34. Data provided by the Fishery Division of the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural 
Reconstruction (]CRR) (copies available from the authors). 
35. Allen, supra note 29. 
36. See FISHERIES YEARBOOK, supra note 33, at 18. 
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TABLE 137 
Fisheries 1977 (mt) 1986 (mt) Rate of Increase 
Total 854,784 1,500,000 75.4% 
Deep Sea 339,411 700,000 106.2% 
Inshore 342,753 460,000 34.2% 
Coastal 32,992 40,000 21.2% 
Aquaculture 159,628 300,000 114.0% 
The four categories of fisheries are arbitrary classifications and may be defined 
as follows: 
a. Deep-sea fisheries are fisheries that operate fishing vessels of over 50 tons 
in size. They are mainly trawlers and tuna long-liners. 
b. Inshore fisheries are fisheries that operate powered vessels of less than 50 
tons in size, which are mainly drag-netters, purse-seiners, long-liners, hand-
liners and spear fishing boats. 
c. Coastal fisheries are fisheries that make use of nonpowered boats or 
operate without boats. They are mainly set net fishing, fishing with light, 
beach seining and gill-netting. 
d. Aquacultural includes culture of fish, shellfish, etc. in brackish and fresh 
water and in shallow seas. 
Imports of fishery products in 1977 totaled 109,845 mt, valued at U.S. 
$85,800,000. The exports totaled 205,966 mt, valued at U.S. $468,700,000. 
The capital investments in fisheries in 1977 totaled U.S. $61,050,000. 38 
Needless to say, the main obstacles to prevent the fisheries production from 
reaching these goals will be the restriction of access, which results from the 
claims to extend exclusive fishing zones announced by the coastal states. Thus 
now is the time for protecting the interests of the Republic's citizens by seek-
ing an adequate policy to resolve these imminent problems. 
There are essentially three approaches available to the Republic of China in 
response to these problems. First, it might do nothing to change its existing 
law, thereby avoiding the provocation of any new diplomatic difficulties with 
those who now use the waters and seabeds near its coast (this we shall term the 
Minimal Solution). But this does nothing to enhance or protect Chinese inter-
ests in more distant areas. This approach also precludes the meaningful articu-
lation of a Chinese position in the arena of state practice - the arena where 
the new law of the sea is being created. Second, the Republic might make a 
claim coextensive with the broadest claim presently nearing acceptance among 
the nations of the world39 (this we shall term the Maximal Solution). Such a 
37. /d. 
38. [d. 
39. See note 22 supra. 
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claim would entail enlarging the Territorial Sea from its present width of 3 
nautical miles, to a width of 12 nautical miles, and the further assertion of ef-
fective and exclusive dominion over the adjacent continental shelf out to its 
geographical terminus, and over an exclusive economic zone extending to a 
maximum of 200 nautical miles from the Republic's shores. This claim is most 
likely to create some period of diplomatic contention, particularly with the Re-
public's neighbors, but it also proffers substantial opportunities to resolve 
those disputes in mutually beneficial ways. Or third, the Republic could assert 
some claim greater than its present claims, but less than the maximum now 
coming to be accepted (which we shall term the Moderate Solution). For 
reasons to be discussed below, this should take the form of limiting the claim 
on the continental shelf to places where the superjacent waters have a depth of 
200 meters or less, and to limiting the exclusive economic zone to a width of 50 
nautical miles from the Republic's shores. This solution would offer some pro-
tection to Chinese interests while generating fewer diplomatic disputes. On 
the other hand, it would also provide fewer mutually beneficial ways of resolv-
ing such disputes as will arise, for this solution provides little diplomatic 
leverage to the Republic of China for negotiating settlements for these 
disputes. 
The remainder of this paper will analyze in detail the three foregoing solu-
tions, both from legal and economic perspectives, before finally recommend-
ing the course the Republic of China should adopt. To help in your reading 
the following analyses, it may be useful to know that we shall recommend the 
Maximal Solution. 
II. EVALUATING SOLUTIONS 
The following section will closely examine the three possible approaches for 
the Republic of China to resolve the Law of the Sea problems outlined above. 
The solutions are diagrammed below in the order in which they will be ex-
amined. 
TABLE 2 
Exclusive Economic 
Territorial Sea Continental Shelf Zone 
A. Minimal Solution 3 nautical miles to 200 meters of none 
water depth; few 
regulations 
B. Moderate Solution 12 nautical miles to 200 meters of 50 nautical miles 
water depth; de- from shore 
tailed regulations 
C. Maximal Solution 12 nautical miles to geographic 200 nautical miles 
limit of shelf; de- from shore 
tailed regulations 
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A. The Minimal Solution 
The solution least likely to generate any diplomatic confrontations is to 
preserve the present laws of the Republic of China regarding the Law of the 
Sea. These existing laws establish a breadth of 3 nautical miles for the ter-
ritorial sea - the least now claimed by any nation. As to the continental shelf, 
sovereignty would be claimed pursuant to the 1958 Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf.40 This claim would be out to a water depth of 200 meters or to 
the yet-to-be defined limit of exploitability. U If the goal is to avoid confronta-
tion with other nations, then the circumspect approach would be to claim only 
to the 200 meter isobath, and to neglect to claim any part of the seabed under 
deeper waters, although this Convention (ratified by the Republic of China) 
would permit a greater claim under the exploitability test. Finally, although 
there might be very narrow claims of protective contiguous zones,42 there 
would be no claim of any exclusive economic rights in the waters beyond the 
limits of the territorial sea. Even as to the economic rights in the continental 
shelf little effort would be made to develop its resources or to regulate its use .. 
This solution has the considerable advantage of avoiding virtually all 
diplomatic difficulties which might ensue from the assertion of any wider 
claims. This is because these claims are beyond dispute. They are the least any 
nation is entitled to make with regard to the waters adjacent to its coasts. Such 
claims are fully approved by the existing 1958 Conventions on the Law of the 
Sea, specifically the Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Although the Republic of 
China has only ratified the Convention on the Continental Shelf,43 the Con-
ventions on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and on the High 
Seas, are in general terms expository of customary law. This has specifically 
been announced by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf Case, H and appears equally true of the other two· conventions 
mentioned above. 
As to the practice of states the 3 mile breadth is, as noted above, the least 
claimed anywhere. As of December, 1974, only 30 nations of 128 (23.4%) 
claimed as little as 3 nautical miles. 45 In the intervening three years, this 
40. Convention on the Continental Shelf, opnudfor signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.471, 
T.I.A.S. No. 5578,499 U.N.T.S. 311 (in force June 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Convention 
on the Continental Shelf). 
41. !d. art. I. 
42. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 12, art. 24. This 
Convention has not been ratified by the Republic of China. 
43. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 13, at 384. 
44. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and 
the Netherlands), (1969)I.C.j. 3. 
45. Nati01l4l Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, 36 LIMITS IN THE SEAS (U.S. Dep't State 1975) 
[hereinafter cited as LIMITS IN THE SEAS). 
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number has further declined. Thus such a claim is beyond challenge on legal 
grounds. 
Similarly, claim to the adjacent continental shelf up to the 200 meter isobath 
is beyond question. Such a claim is permitted by the Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf46 - which is the most widely ratified of any of the 1958 Conven-
tions,47 and which alone has been directly held by the International Court of 
Justice to be declarative of the customary law. 48 By neglecting either to 
develop its shelf or to regulate the use of its shelf, the Republic would further 
minimize the prospects of controversy over its use with any potential com-
peting users. 
Claims of contiguous zones could be of two types - protective or economic. 
Protective contiguous zones are provided for in the Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Art. 24.49 The zones were to be solely 
for the prevention of infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary 
regulations. This article did not merely declare existing customary law in at 
least two respects. First, it did not exhaustively list the purposes for which such 
zones had in fact been established. At the least, it omitted mention of national 
security zones. 50 Second, the article specified a narrower width than many na-
tions had in fact claimed. Thus the United States claimed a customs zone with 
a maximum possible width of 62 miles,51 and an Air Defense Identification 
Zone extending at least 150 miles to sea. 52 Nor did the Convention provide for 
exclusive fishing or economic zones. 
Increasing numbers of nations claim an exclusive economic or fishing zone 
of up to 200 miles in breadth. The United States claimed such an exclusive 
fishing zone for itself from March 1, 1971.53 Nearly all the proposals made in 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law ofthe Sea have provided for 
some such exclusive economic zone, although varying in their details as to the 
breadth and limitations on the rights of the coastal states. 
The foregoing should demonstrate that the assertion of protective con-
tiguous zones, without any economic contiguous zone, as contemplated by the 
46. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 40, art. 1. 
47. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 13. 
48. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and 
the Netherlands), (1969)I.C.J. 3. 
49. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 12. 
50. 49U.S.C. U 1348(a),1510(1976); Head,ADIZ, InlmultlO1llJllAw tJtUl Contiguous AirsplJCe, 3 
ALBERTA L. REV. 182 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Head). See Brown, ProtectiveJurisdiction, 34 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 112 (1940); Fenwick, The Declo.ration of Paft(JmIJ., 34 AM.J. INT'L L. 116 (1940); Master· 
son, The Hemisphere Zone of Security and the lAw, 26 A.B.A. J. 860 (1940); McDougal & Schlei, The 
Hydrogen &mb Tests in Perspective: lAwful Measures for Seeurity, 64 YALE L. J. 648, 677 (1955). 
51. Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 19 U.S.C. S 1701 (1976); 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND ApPUED BY THE UNITED STATES 780-94 (2d rev. ed. 1945). 
52. 49 U.S.C. U 1348(a), 1510 (1970), 14 C.F.R. S 99.43 (1979). 
53. See note 25 supra. 
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1958 Conference on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone would 
almost certainly result in no controversy with any other state. This is the great 
advantage of continuing the Minimal Solution as the law of the Republic of 
China regarding all three areas: territorial sea; continental shelf; and con-
tiguous zones. 
The great disadvantage of the Minimal Solution is that it secures diplomatic 
ease at the cost of abandoning major interests of the Republic of China and its 
people. Opportunities to control access to the waters adjacent to China's 
coasts for military, economic, and other purposes are restricted to the narrow-
est scope claimed by any other country, and the day can not be far off when 
these claims will be less extensive than any other country as more and more 
nations move to enlarged claims. As these claims are so restricted, they afford 
the Republic and its citizens far less protection than most other countries claim 
for themselves and their citizens. This not only permits interests to intrude in-
to nearby waters of the Republic, but it also prevents the Republic from being 
able to offer reciprocal concessions in attempting to protect the access of 
Chinese fishermen to waters near foreign shores, or other similar interests of 
China and its citizens in distant waters. The claims of the Republic of China 
under this Minimal Solution are so restricted that there is almost no room for 
concessions by the Republic in favor of other nations, and should some con-
cessions be devised they would be so limited in scale that they could scarcely 
provoke any meaningful counter-concessions from other countries. 
To be more specific, the Republic of China is a high consumer of animal 
protein - about 150 kg. per person per year, of which about 37.4 kg. comes 
from fish products. 54 At the beginning of 1977, the population of Taiwan, the 
Republic of China, was 16,508,000. 55 As the population increases steadily, 
about 300,000 per year, the people living in this. small island will increase to 
about 20 million by the end of 1986.56 This is one of the most important 
pressures on the Republic's fisheries to promote their fisheries production. 
The exports and imports of fish products of the Republic contributed a 
surplus of 400 million U.S. dollars in 1977. Being predicted and planned to in-
crease in the future years, this is also another serious pressure on their fishing 
activities. 
The deep-sea fisheries and inshore fisheries are two major fisheries of the 
Republic and occupy 39.8% and 40% respectively in total fish production of 
this nation in 1977. These two major fisheries will occupy about 46.7% and 
31 % respectively in the total fish production planned by the authorities in 
1986. 
54. Gih, Present Status and Further Development oj Fisheries Resources oj the Ocean, jCRR FISHERIES 
SERIES No. 16 (Mar. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Gih). 
55. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF TAIWAN (Republic of China 1979). 
56. /d. 
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The deep-sea fisheries use fishing vessels of over 50 tons in size, consisting 
mainly of otter trawl (single vessel operation), bull trawl (pair vessels opera-
tion) and tuna long-line. There are presently 344 vessels totaling 46,649 tons 
of otter trawl and 368 vessels of bull trawl totaling 79,342 tons, both operating 
mainly in the area of Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, South China Sea, Sunda 
Shelf and North Australian Sea, some larger vessels even reaching to the 
coasts of Alaska and West Africa. There are presently 680 vessels, aggregating 
139,995 tons, of tuna long-line. Their fishing extends to the Pacific, Indian 
and Atlantic Oceans. 
The announcements of 200-miles exclusive economic zones and/or fishing 
zones by various coastal states threaten to decrease about 50% of the fish 
catching of the Republic's deep-sea fisheries. The plausible compensatory ap-
proaches to make up this loss the Republic of China now faces are first, to 
negotiate with various coastal states about mutual fishing cooperation, and 
second, to more intensively exploit the abundant migrating fish resources in 
Taiwan's adjacent waters. Unfortunately, the Republic of China does not 
have any room available to offer concessions in favor of another nation in 
negotiation on the basis of mutual benefit. Thus it is difficult to expect success 
in the first approach if the Republic still adopts the Minimal Solution. On the 
other hand, the Republic of China does not possess any exclusive right under 
the Minimal Solution to exploit the abundant migrating fish resources such as 
mackerel, anchovy, amber fish, bonito, mullet, skipjack, etc., which exist in 
the waters around Taiwan. 
The inshore fisheries are using powered vessels of less than 50 tons in size, 
consisting mainly of drag-netters, purse-seiners, long-liners, hand-liners and 
spear fishing boats. There are presently 10,477 vessels totaling 146,526 tons, 
fishing within 30 nautical miles of the Republic's surrounding waters. Even 
this, the narrowest inshore fishery area in the world at the present time, still 
faces serious threats from foreign vessels since the Republic of China claims 
only 3 nautical miles of sovereignty under its present law regarding the sea. 
In sum, the Minimal Solution neither protects important interests of the 
Republic of China and its citizens, such as most other nations now protect, 
nor does it provide the means whereby mutually beneficial solutions might be 
negotiated. Since much more can be claimed without provoking serious 
diplomatic difficulties in view of the present developments in the Law of the 
Sea, little or nothing is gained by continuing the Minimal Solution, while 
much is lost. 
B. The Moderate Solution 
Once one defines the Minimal and Maximal Solutions, the Republic could 
for good reasons settle on any intermediate solution as a compromise between 
its various competing interests. In this context those interests are the adequate 
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protection of the economic and security interests of the Republic without pro-
voking diplomatic contentions which could rebound to the serious injury of the 
economic or security interests of the Republic. Any new claims by the 
Republic should contain two elements: a breadth of 12 nautical miles for the 
territorial sea; and a clear assertion of authority over the continental shelf to a 
depth of 200 meters for the superjacent waters, in the form of detailed regula-
tions designed to promote and to regulate its use. Further, there should be 
declared an exclusive economic zone for the use oflicensees from the Republic 
out to some appropriate distance from shore. With the goal of maximizing 
protection of the economic interests of the Republic while minimizing the risks 
of confrontations with its neighbors, we have here used the distance of 50 
nautical miles, which is wide enough to assert control of substantial resources, 
but narrow enough to avoid overlapping the claims of neighboring states. Cer-
tain other contiguous zones might be created or continued,for protective pur-
poses, but most of these would be absorbed into the enlarged territorial sea. 
The 12 mile territorial sea represents the emerging consensus of the practice 
of nations. In December, 1975,57 56 (43.4%) of 128 nations had asserted 12 
miles as the breadth of their territorial sea. Only 24 (18.8%) asserted any 
greater breadth. In the three years since the consensus on 12 miles, it has 
become even more pronounced. Even the United States, long the staunchest 
supporter of the 3 mile limit, has publicly accepted the 12 mile breadth while 
insisting that this be accompanied by international agreements to preserve free 
navigation in international straits of greater breadth than 6 miles, but less than 
24 miles. 58 Thus the 12 mile limit is unlikely today to provoke any dispute, 
especially as there are no international straits under the control of the 
Republic of China which are less than 24 miles wide. Such a territorial sea 
would also be sufficient for the purposes of protective contiguous zones as pro-
vided in Article 24 of the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 59 These purposes are to prevent infringement 
of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations. Article 24 limits the 
breadth of such zones to 12 miles from the shore. Full authority for these pur-
poses would exist in the territorial sea, so no special zones would be necessary. 
Nor would such a widened assertion of authority interfere with freedom of 
navigation since there would still exist within the territorial sea the right of 
innocent passage. 60 There is some dispute whether this right extends to 
57. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 45. Cj O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 461-65. 
58. U.S. Dep't of Defense Press Release, United States Policy with Respect to Territorial Seas 
(Feb. 25, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Defense Dep't Press Release), reprinted in KNIGHT, supra note 
24, at 332. 
59. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 12. 
60. [d. arts. 14-23. 
1980) REPUBUC OF CHINA'S CLAIMS 367 
military ships,61 and it does not permit submerged navigation. 62 While these 
restrictions are of concern to the major navies of the world with regard to in-
ternational straits, there are no such straits involved in the present situation. 
The Republic of China's national security reasonably requires control of such 
navigation in waters within 12 miles of its coasts. Indeed, the Republic could 
reasonably claim a special national security contiguous zone of much greater 
breadth under existing international law. 63 
Similarly, the Republic should make effective its claims to the adjacent con-
tinental shelf. As with the 12 mile territorial sea, an effective assertion of con-
trol out to the 200 meter isobath is beyond legal challenge. It is the minimum 
authorized by the 1958 United. Nations Convention on the Continental 
Shelf,6. which has been ratified by the Republic of China. Special provisions 
must be made for negotiating demarcation lines with Japan and the Republic 
of the Philippines, and some limitation on development of the continental shelf 
in the direction of those countries pending agreement on the lines of demarca-
tion should be made. This should be seen not, however, as an invitation for 
discord with neighbors, but as an opportunity to develop new cooperative 
links pursuant to successful negotiations conducted in a spirit of mutually 
beneficial exchange. Effective assertion of control over the continental shelf 
would, of course, have to be' suspended with regard to the shelf adjacent to 
coasts currently held by the rebel regime pending recovery of the mainland. 
Increasing numbers of nations now assert either exclusive fishing ZOnes or 
exclusive economic zones over waters of varying widths from their coasts, up 
to a maximum of 200 miles. 6~ Such a zone has been included in all of the 
various proposals before the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea. While varying widths have been suggested for such a zone, sometimes 
called the "patrimonial sea," there appears now to be increasing agreement 
on 200 miles as the maximum permissible width. Also, various limitations 
have been proposed on the powers of the coastal state in this zone, particularly 
with a view to enhancing the rights of landlocked states. 66 There is as yet no 
discernible agreement on such limitations. Today the major resource to be 
gained from such a claim is fish, since mineral rights are generally already 
protected by the claim with regard to the continental shelf. There is no reason, 
61. /d. an. 23. &e, e.g., Shyam, IntematioMI Straits and Ocean Law, 15 INDIAN]. INT'L L. 17 
(1975). 
62. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 12, art. 14(b). 
63. Cj Head, supra note 50. 
64. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 40. 
65. &e note 22 supra. 
66. Alexander & Hodgson, The Role of the Geographically-Disadvantaged States in the Law of the &a, 
13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 558 (1976); Logue, The Nepal Proposalfor a Common Heritage Fund, 9 CAL. 
W. INT'L L.]. 598 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Logue). 
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however, not to anticipate future technologies and to claim authority over the 
economically usable resources of these waters of whatever nature. Given the 
increasingly general acceptance of such zones, the only real problem should be 
defining its width. 
If the purpose of such a zone is to enhance the economic growth of the 
Republic, and particularly its fishing industry, then the broader the zone the 
greater the likelihood it will achieve its purpose. On the other hand, there is 
also greater likelihood of diplomatic confrontation with other nations which 
use the deep ocean fisheries near to the Republic. This risk can be minimized 
by selecting a narrow width, particularly one which does not overlap waters 
which are closer to other nations than to China, such as the 50 miles width 
selected for this proposal. Any other width might, in fact, be selected, but the 
principles of the analysis would remain unchanged. 
The advantage of selecting a relatively narrow width for the exclusive 
economic zone is that it gives some protection of the Republic's fishing in-
dustry while reducing the risk, and circumscribing the nature of subsequent 
diplomatic confrontations. Such a narrow zone would not, however, prevent 
all diplomatic controversies since several nations, notably Japan and the 
Republic of Korea, already have substantial fishing interests within 50 miles 
of the Republic's coasts. And such a claim by the Republic would be an excuse 
for the diligent prosecution of such claims against Chinese fishing boats, as the 
claims of Japan and Korea are out to 200 milesY The smaller breadth of the 
claim of the Republic of China could hamper any attempt to negotiate mutual-
ly beneficial concessions with nations making broader claims. Indeed, it is not 
inconceivable that some countries will decide that they have more to gain from 
excluding the Chinese from a 200 mile zone around their coast, than they will 
gain from securing access within a 50 mile zone near the Republic's coasts. 
Such a narrow limit may even hinder reaching agreements to demarcate the 
boundaries between islands under differing sovereignties. Thus, if Japan 
claims 200 miles, and the Republic of China only 50 miles, what concession 
can the Republic offer the Japanese for their surrender of part of their claim 
since the Republic has already foresworn any claim on the Japanese side of 
these waters. It would be better to. assert a broader claim in such a way that 
friendly and mutually beneficial solutions are invited rather than to unilateral-
ly renounce any claim which might intrude upon a neighbor. Such a broader 
claim would also enhance protection of Chinese interests where there are no 
other lands in close proximity. 
In sum, the Moderate Solution gives some considerable protection to the in-
terests of the Republic and its citizens while foreswearing any assertion of 
authority which might in the least provoke confrontations with neighboring 
67. Japanese Extending National Sea Limits, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1977, at A5, col. 1. 
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countries. While such an approach may appear attractive, it is illusory. Con-
frontations with neighbors are inevitable as more and more nations make ever 
broaders assertions of authority over nearby seas. Confrontations in such cir-
cumstances can only be avoided if the Republic is prepared to foreswear pro-
tecting or asserting the interests of its citizens in the waters of its neighbors, 
while the successful negotiation of mutually beneficial solutions of these diffi-
culties is hindered, if not altogether prevented, by excessive caution in the 
claims asserted by the RepUblic. The greater the initial claim by the Republic, 
the greater the concessions it can offer in exchange for concessions for the 
other side. The process is not hampered ifthe initial assertion of these claims is 
made in such a fashion as to invite cooperative determination of mutual rights 
where mutual interests exist. The form of the claim, not its content, is where 
unilateral concessions should be made. 
C. The Maximol Solution 
The Maximal Solution would incorporate the same features as the 
Moderate Solution with regard to the territorial sea and protective contiguous 
zones. The discussion of these matters need not be repeated here. The ap-
proach to the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone would be con-
siderably different in that it would be considerably broader. Even here, 
however, the claim would not be as extensive as the broadest assertion now 
made - a 200 mile wide territorial sea.68 Rather the claims to be asserted here 
would be the broadest likely to gain acceptance from other nations, and the 
claims should be asserted in a way to invite discussion leading to mutually 
beneficial solutions where other nations rightly feel that the· Republic of 
China's claim impinges on their national interests. 
With the foregoing general points in mind, the specific assertions of authori-
ty contemplated under the Maximal Solution are: over the adjacent continen-
tal shelf to water depth as far as the true geographical limits of the shelf; and 
over an exclusive economic zone to a maximum breadth of 200 miles from 
shore. Both of these claims should be suspended as to those parts of the 
Republic not actually under the effective control of the government pending 
restoration of its authority. And such claims should be temporarily suspended 
where they would reach into waters or seabeds closer to other nations than to 
the Republic of China to provide a reasonable opportunity to negotiate fair 
demarcation lines. Such an approach not only affords maximum protection to 
Chinese interests, it also becomes a channel for further positive experiences 
between the Republic and other nations with whom it will have to deal regard-
ing these claims. Not only immediate neighbors will be affected by these new 
68. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 45. 
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claims. Thus, these claims will become the occasion for favorable exchange 
even with distant nations. 
Using the United States as an example of a distant nation which will be in-
terested in these claims, its reaction can be predicted with some accuracy: 
There may well be the formality of a protest, but in fact the position of the 
Republic of China ·can only be enhanced. The major real interests of the 
United States in the water of the area can easily be accommodated. By restric-
ting the enlarged territorial water claim to 12 miles, no real interference is 
threatened to the movements of the U.S. Navy.69 Even should an enlarged 
National Security Zone or Air Defense Identification Zone be proclaimed or 
enforced, this could easily be structured so as to accommodate U.S. military 
needs. The other potential U.S. interest in the region would be in the exploita-
tion of the mineral resources of the continental shelf. 70 This interest is still only 
potential, not actual, and thus can be accommodated to the extent the 
Republic of China chooses in light of the benefits to be achieved from accom-
modating it. Thus licensing U. S. companies to extract these resources could 
speed their development while forging new ties of mutual interest between the 
countries. On the other hand, restricting such extraction to Chinese, while 
foregoing the former advantages, does not impinge directly on substantial ex-
isting interests of the United States. 
In one area the interests of the Republic even in distant waters will be 
enhanced. Since March 1, 1977, fishing by unlicensed foreign fishing vessels 
has been prohibited within 200 miles of the coast of the United States71 except 
as to highly migratory species of fish. 72 Licenses may be issued only pursuant 
to a valid international fishery agreement,75 and then only on a basis of 
reciprocity, that is, only if the second nation is prepared to grant like privileges 
to U.S. fishing vessels. The enlarged breadth of claim puts the Republic of 
China in a position to offer reciprocal permits. If few or no American fishing 
vessels choose to avail themselves of this privilege, it would still qualify 
Chinese boats for such permits from the U.S. pursuant to a suitable agree-
ment. Since any new agreement to enlarge permitted Chinese catches in U.S. 
waters would have to be approved by Congress,74 now would be an opportune 
69. Defense Dep't Press Release, supra note 58, reprinted in KNIGHT, supra note 24, at 332. 
70. Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yii-tai (SenkaIco) Islands and the Law of Territorial 
Acquisition, 14: VA. J. INT'L L. 221 (1974); Harrison, Time Bomb in East ASM, 20 FOR. POL'Y 3 
(1975); Liu, China and Off-Short Oil: The Tiao-yii Dispute, 10 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 143 (1975); 
Park, The Sino-Japanese-Korean Sea Resources Controver~ and the Hypothesis oj a 200-Milt Economic Zone, 
16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 27 (1975); Oda, The Delimitation oflhe Continental Shelf in Southeast ASM and the 
Far Easl, 1 OCEAN MANAGEMENT 327 (1973). The Mainland regime has apparently accepted the 
Japanese claim to the Tiao-yii Islands, but ,the Republic has not. 
71. The Fishery Conservation & Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. U 1801-1802 (Supp. 
1977). 
72. /d, S 1813. 
73. /d. S 1821. 
74. Id. S 1823. 
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time to attempt to secure agreements. Such an agreement would be a further 
tangible token of support for the Republic of China without directly con-
trovening any other agreements to which the U.S. is a party. This would ap-
pear to fit the mood of Congress particuarly well at this time. But such an 
agreement is made much easier by the opportunity to offer reciprocal 
privileges to American fishermen which in turn requires the assertion of some 
substantial exclusive economic claim of the Republic's coasts. 
Japan, as an illustration of the opportunities presented for negotiating 
mutually beneficial solutions with neighboring nations, would have similar in-
terests and similar responses as to the matters discussed with regard to the 
United States. Japan would also be concerned with precisely delineating the 
boundaries for the continental shelves, and for exclusive economic or fishing 
zones, where Japanese and Chinese claims overlap, If properly phrased, the 
proclamation of the new claims by the Republic of China could be an invita-
tion to negotiate these boundaries rather than an occasion for confrontation 
and discord. Presented as such, neither side of the negotiating process need 
fear loss of face. It is true that these negotiations, as with the United States, 
will have to be conducted through what are technically unofficial channels. 
That cannot be helped. However, the settlement of such important matters 
through "unofficial channels'" cannot but underscore the absurdity of the 
present posture of these governments vis-a-vis the Republic of China, and this 
must in the long run rebound to the benefit of the Republic. 
The Republic of China has many strong bases on which the 200 mile ex-
clusive economic would be justly claimed. First, protection of the livelihoods 
of inshore fishermen living in the Republic. Second, conserving the natural 
resources, including both replenishable and nonreplenishable stocks, at sus-
tainable levels for all people. And third, for helping to develop better utiliza-
tion of these resources. 
Regarding protection of the livelihood of the Republic's inshore fishermen, 
many bioiogists7S and economists" have deeply analyzed this problem from 
different perspectives. For illustration, the purse seine fishery operating in 
northeastern Taiwan's waters will be a good example. There are more than 
5,000 full-time fishermen and more than 400 small size fishing vessels, scaling 
from 20 to 30 tons, in this fishery. A research project77 found the following: 
(1) The rate of return on investment (ROI) is relatively small: the 
ROIs of 1973, 1974 and 1975 are 4.9%, 2.2% and 8.4% 
respectively. 
75. Gih, supra note 54; Liu, sufwa note 30. 
76. CHEN &: Tu, THE OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT OF THE TAIWAN TUNA FISHING IN· 
DUSTRY (1976). 
77. Wang, &o_it: Studies 011 T,uWtUl's Purs, Seilll Fishi.,., lruJrutry, JCRR FISHERIES SERIES No. 
22 (June 1976). 
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(2) The average fisherman's income is lower as compared with 
that of other economic segments. The average income per 
month in 1973, 1974- and 1975 was U.S. $61.5, $53.1 and 
$72.4- respectively. 
(3) The calculated income statements in 1973, 1974, 1975 show 
that 51.7%, 58.8% and 36% of industry in the respective 
years are in net loss. 
(4-) The most troublesome factor influencing the operations is that 
the fishery resources are badly deteriorated. 
(5) The degree of resource scarcity is aggravated by the fact that 
the productivity per ship decreases annually at the rate of 1.97 
x 103 kgs. 
(6) That new fishing grounds near to traditional ones exist and are 
abundant in migratory fish is proven by the fact that Japanese 
large purse seine ship groups catch over 300,000 tons annually 
in the southern area of the East China Sea. The Japanese ships 
operate mainly within 100 nautical miles of the Republic's 
coast. The quantities caught by Japanese are more than 10 
times the quantities caught by the Republic's inshore fisher-
men in the same area. 
Although several strong recommendations have been addressed to ship 
owners and the authority for resolving this serious problem,78 the threat to the 
livelihoods of the Republic's inshore fishermen will continue as long as the 
Republic of China does not have any right to exclude foreign vessels. 
There are abundant migratory fish resources existing in the waters around 
Taiwan such as mackerel, anchovy, amber fish, bonito, mullet and skipjack. 
The principal opportunity for expansion in the Republic's region lies with the 
bonito and skipjack tuna, which are species of tropical and subtropical waters, 
especially in the southern Pacific Ocean. At present a major survey of the skip-
jack tuna stocks with a high degree of feasibility for being caught, are 1.2 
million tons in this area. 79 A suitable exploitation of this resource will solve 
most of the problems the Republic now faces. 
The central spirit of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea is not merely to provide coastal states the exclusive rights to exploit 
their adjacent resources, but to give these nations Suitable responsibilities for 
conserving and managing its resources. 80 The sixth session, held in New 
York, produced a "composite negotiating test"81 - a single comprehensive 
78. Wang, Efficient Management and Cost-Benefit Analysisfor the Large Scale Purse Seine Fishing In-
dustry in Taiwan, JCRR FISHERIES SERIES No. 26 Oune 1977). 
79. A. WANG & H. LIU, STUDIES ON PROBLEMS AND POLICIES OF DEEP SEA FISHERIES FOR THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1978). 
80. E. BORGESE, PACEM IN MARIBUS (1972); Logue, supra note 66; Mirvahabi, Conservation and 
Management of Fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 9 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 225 (1978); Symposium 
on the Exclusive Economic Zone, 4 MAR. POL. & MANAGEMENT 313 (1977). 
81. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, 8 U.N. CLOSOR 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP.1O 
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document of 303 articles and seven annexes which was, in effect, a draft of a 
new Law of the Sea. A revised version of this was being discussed again in 
March, 1978, in Geneva. The sections of the "composite negotiating text" for 
a new Law of the Sea which are of most interest to fishermen and fisheries, 
and administrators, are found in Part V of the text which deals with the 
establishment of Exclusive Economic Zone. 
Based on these sections in the text, the diplomatic dispute between the 
Republic of China and other neighboring countries is less likely to arise if the 
Republic of China announces her Maximal Solution to extend to 200 miles an 
exclusive economic zone. 82 The main provisions of this text are as follows. In 
the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has sovereign rights for the pur-
pose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources. 83 The coastal state shall promote the objective of optimum utiliza-
tion of living resources in the exclusive zone. 8• Where the coastal state does 
not have capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through 
agreements or other arrangements, give other states access to the surplus of 
the allowable catch. 85 The coastal state, taking into account the best scientific 
evidence available to it, is to determine the allowable catch of living resources 
in its exclusive economic zone, 
By enacting the jurisdictional powers and economic rights within the 
claimed exclusive economic zone, the Republic of China will not merely ob-
tain rights, but also obligations to the whole world. 86 Like other coastal states 
which claimed exclusive economic or fishing zones such as Australia, Canada 
and the United States, the Republic of China will find it necessary to provide 
the scientific, economic and biological data available to determine the allow-
able catch. Diplomatic disputes with other countries will be less likely to arise 
if the Republic of China asserts her exclusive economic zone subject to respon-
sibilities similar to those accepted by other coastal states already, 87 
In sum, the Maximal Solution combines maximum protection to the in-
terests of the Republic of China and its citizens, while also affording the 
greatest opportunity for negotiating mutually beneficial solutions with other 
interested nations. If approached properly, it encourages international cooper-
ation at a time of strained relations between the Republic and some of the 
other interested nations. The only real drawback is the need to enforce the 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as I.C.N.T.). See Gold, The Third United Nations Conferenct on the Law oftht 
Sea: The Sixth Session, Ntw York, 1977, 5 MAR. POL. & MANAGEMENT 63 (1978). 
82. Kapoor, The DtlimilaJion of Exclusivt &onomic Zones, 4 MAR. POL. & MANAGEMENT 255 
(1977). 
83. I.C.N.T., supra note 81, art. 56. 
84. /d. an. 62. 
85. /d. 
86. Logue, supra note 66, at 606-15. 
87. Set, t.g., The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. S 1821(d) 
(Supp. 1977). 
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claim once it is made, but if little Iceland, with neither a navy nor an airforce, 
could enforce its claims against the United Kingdom,88 then certainly the 
Republic of China could do so as well. The real danger here is to be careful 
both in defining and in enforcing the claims so that overzealous subordinates 
do not convert this opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperative solutions 
into sources of discord and enmity. 
III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
There are two special problems which deserve at least a few words: first, the 
problem of the mainland; and the second, the special problems of waters 
around, or between, islands. 
A. The Mainland 
Special care must be taken to assure that negotiations with other interested 
nations do not become confused with contentions relating to the ultimate 
authority of the Republic over all of its territory. Nor should such claims 
become the excuse for premature military or economic confrontations with the 
so-called government on the mainland. Both of these goals should be achieved 
by including in any law or proclamation of these new assertions of authority 
provisions to suspend its application with regard to the mainland prior to its 
recovery. Particular attention must be given to delineate the area of suspen-
sion within the Straits of Taiwan as these waters are only 120 miles in breadth 
at their narrowest. We would suggest drawing a line west of the Penghu 
Islands, but do not at this time suggest any particular line. 
B. Island Filled Seas 
A number of nations have asserted a special archipelagic theory of territorial 
waters. 89 An archipelago is a group of closely interrelated islands forming a 
distinct or distinguishable unit. 90 The word itself was originally Greek, and 
means an "island filled sea." This theory is most significantly espoused by the 
Republics of the Philippines91 and Indonesia,92 but it is also followed by 
88. See note 19 supra. 
89. Dellapenna, Canadian Claims, supra note 18, at 411-17; Dellapenna, The Philippines Ter-
ritorial Water Claim in International Law, 5 J. L. & ECON. DEV. 45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
Dellapenna]. Comment, The Third United Nations Coriference on the Law of the Sea and an Archipelagic 
Regime, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 742 (1976); McConnell, The Legal Regime <if Archipelagoes, 35 SASK. 
L. REV. 121 (1970); Pharand, The Waters of the Canadian Arctic Islands, 3 OTTAWA L. REV. 414 
(1969). 
90. I.C.N.T., supra note 81, art. 46(b). 
91. Dellapenna, supra note 88; Mendoza, The Base-lines of the Philippine Archipelago, 46 PHIL. L. 
].628 (1971). 
92. Draper, The Indonesian Archipelagic State Doctrine and the Law <if the Sea: "Territorial Grab" or 
Justifiable Necessity?, 11 INT'L LAW. 143 (1977). 
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several smaller island nations,95 and by several continental nations with regard 
to off-shore archipelagoes. 94 This theory involves the drawing of straight base-
lines connecting the outermost edges of the island groupS.95 The waters within 
the baselines become internal waters within which there may be no right of in-
nocent passage. 96 The territorial sea is then measured out from the baselines, 
as would also be measured any exclusive economic or fishing zone.9' 
Such a system of baselines has a certain superficial appeal for the Republic 
of China's presently controlled territory, but any attempt to assert such lines 
around the entire groups of islands it controls can only invite difficulties for no 
comparable gain. The difficulties arise from the result that large areas of 
waters would be enclosed and claimed as internal waters, not subject to the 
right of innocent passage, thus substantially interfering with the purely 
navigational - military and civilian - interests of other nations. Such in-
terference will certainly be ill-received. On the one hand, as most of the outly-
ing islands are located in the Straits of Taiwan, any substantial moving out-
ward of the boundaries of the exclusive economic zone would only have to be 
suspended anyway, and thus very little, if anything, would be gained. 
Nor can one be so certain of the resolution of the ensuing difficulties. The 
United States has thus far refused to recognize the claims of the Philippines 
and Indonesia, and still occasionally sends submarines or other military craft 
through the waters they claim in order to effectively challenge their claims.98 
The criteria for judging the propriety of baselines are vague. 99 These criteria 
are that the baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the 
general direction of the coast, that the sea areas within the baseline be suffi-
ciently closely linked with the land domain as to justify a regime of internal 
waters, and recognition may be given to particular local economic interests 
clearly evidenced by long usage. Such vague criteria are simply not conducive 
to the ready negotiation of agreements for international recongition. Thus, 
proclaiming a baselines system around the entire groups of islands would be 
more trouble than it is worth. At any appropriate future time the Republic 
might well consider a system of baselines linking the Province of Taiwan and 
other off-shore islands to its mainland territory, but now is clearly not an ap-
93. McLoughlin, Tiu APfJrtHUh by Fiji - A Mid-Ocean Archipelago - to tIu Confermct on llu Law of 
tluSta, 1 MELANESIAN L.J. 37 (1974). 
94. The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, (1951) I.C.). 8; Canadian Note to the United 
States, April 16, 1970, rtprinltd in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 607 (1970), quoted in Dellapenna, Cana-
dian Claims, supra note 18, at 404 n.116. 
95. I.C.N.T., supra note 81, art. 47. Cf Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone, supra note 12, art. 4. 
96. [d. art. 5; I.C.N.T., supra note 81, arts. 50, 52-53. 
97. [d. art. 48. 
98. Dean, supra note 14, at 753. 
99. Convention, supra note 12, art. 4; I.C.N.T., supra note 81, art. 47. For an analysis of these 
standards, set Dellapenna, Canadian Claims, supra note 18, at 414-15. 
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propriate time for this step As an interim measure, however, baselines might 
be drawn around clearly identifiable groups of islands now controlled by the 
government - such as the Penghu Islands, 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The emerging new consensus on what is permissible in the Law of the Sea 
presents an unusually favorable opportunity for the Republic of China to ex-
tend its protection of its vital interests, and enhance its economic development 
without producing any serious difficulties for its relations with other nations. 
Indeed, properly handled, these new claims could become an important occa-
sion for developing new cooperative mutually beneficial links with both near-
by and distant nations. 
The foregoing results can best be achieved by enlarging the breadth of the 
territorial sea from 3 to 12 nautical miles, claiming effective control of that 
portion of the Asian continental shelf adjacent to the territory presently con-
trolled by the Republic of China, and the assertion of an exclusive economic 
zone of 200 miles breadth from the baseline of the territorial sea. There might 
also be enforcement of one or more national security, or air defense identifica-
tion zones, and a system of straight baselines around small groups of islands. 
All of these claims must be clearly suspended with regard to those portions of 
the territory of the Republic not presently under its actual control. These 
claims must also be asserted and enforced in ways which encourage other 
interested nations to seek mutual accommodations which most effectively 
enhance the interests of both nations. 
The foregoing proposal not only permits the Republic of China to protect its 
own interests, but also gives it an important role in the arena of state practice 
where the new international Law of the Sea is being forged. This to a consider-
able extent should make up for the enforced absence of the Republic from the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea - an absence ofless 
importance as the Third Conference now appears to be nearing failure. loo 
Even should the Conference unexpectedly succeed, its conventions are not 
very likely to differ substantially from the recommendations made here, as 
these recommendations reflect the growing consensus of the international 
community as to what is permissible to the coastal state. It is this very agree-
ment of these recommendations with the new consensus which leads us con-
fidently to predict a successful outcome to any ensuing bilaterial negotiations. 
100. Logue, supra note 66, at 621-25; Smith, The Seabed Negotiation and the Law of the Sea Con-
ference - Readyfor a Divorce?, 18 VA. J. INTL L. 43 (1977). 
